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Abstract
The influential economic theory of intergenerational transfers predicts a negative
connection between credit constraints and intergenerational mobility of consumption.
Existing work has used bequest receipt to signal a parent’s access to credit markets
when investing in his children’s human capital. Yet measurement error in bequest
receipt generates misclassification error and thus attenuation bias. Employing switching
regressions with imperfect sample separation to deal with this error, we show that the
intergenerational persistence of consumption in the U.S. for credit constrained families
is much higher than for unconstrained families, contrary to what the theory implies.
This means children from constrained families are more likely to have consumption
levels similar to those of their parents than children from unconstrained families. Our
results are robust to the choice of bequest variables and other predictive variables in the
switching equation.
JEL Classification: C13, D12, E21, J62
Key Words: Intergenerational Persistence, Intergenerational Mobility, Consumption, Bor-
rowing Constraints, Switching Regression, Misclassification Error, Euler Equation
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Friedman (1957) and Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), the fact
that life-cycle consumption is much smoother than income has been established as one of the
cornerstones in macroeconomics. Economic agents are able to optimize on their life-cycle
consumption via the means of saving and borrowing. Similarly, family dynasties may be
able to optimize on their lifetime consumption across generations through the channel of
intergenerational transfers.
Yet, despite strong evidence of the massive intergenerational asset transfers (Kotlikoff
and Summers, 1981), few studies — except perhaps Mulligan (1997, 1999) and Waldkirch
et al. (2004)1 — have explored the intergenerational dynamics of consumption. In contrast,
there is a large body of estimates on intergenerational relationships in income or earnings,
for the United States and for other countries around the world.2
Investigating the intergenerational consumption relationship would complement our
knowledge of the relationship of intergenerational income or earnings. Consumption is a
more direct measure of economic wellbeing than income. Furthermore, understanding the
intergenerational effects of parental financial transfers on consumption would be helpful
for sensible public policy design. If parents are transferring resources in various forms
(including financial transfers) in an optimal manner to promote their offspring’s’ overall
wellbeing, then government transfer programs that target disadvantageous individuals at
specific life stages through specific channels (e.g., education financial aids, or food stamp
programs) may replace or crowd out parental inputs without achieving the same optimal
effects on the overall wellbeing of these individuals.
Broadly, our study is linked to the question of how to interpret parental financial transfers
1Waldkirch et al. (2004) examined the intergenerational correlation in consumption due to the intergenera-
tional linkages in income and tastes in a structural econometric framework, which in substance significantly
differs from our model of interpreting and estimating the intergenerational consumption correlation.
2See the references in Mulligan (1997), and more recently, Chadwick and Solon (2002), Gaviria (2002), Ermisch
et al. (2006), Mazumder (2005), Blanden et al. (2007), Bratsberg et al. (2007), Lee and Solon (2009).
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to their adult children.3 Financial transfers from parents can occur in the form of inter
vivos (i.e., between living persons) gifts,4 or of bequests.5 6 The literature has debated
on whether post-education financial transfers are driven by parental altruism, or by an
exchange arrangement in return for services delivered or expected to be delivered from adult
children. Previous studies have found evidence that inter vivos transfers are consistent with
both motives (Cox, 1987, 1990),7 yet bequest transfers consistent with neither (Tomes, 1981;
Wilhelm, 1996). McGarry (1999) showed that an altruistic parent makes inter vivos transfers
to ease his child’s liquidity constraints (therefore strongly related to her current income),
and arranges bequest transfers in response to the child’s permanent income (therefore only
partially related to her current income).
More closely is our study linked to the view that treats bequest receipt as a signal of
access to credit markets for human capital investments. Becker and Tomes (1986) argued
that altruistic parents leave financial bequests to children only after they have made efficient
human capital investments in their children. Under imperfect credit markets, there are
credit constrained parents who cannot self-finance these investments without forgoing own
consumption that has an opportunity cost higher than the market interest rate. This results
in a lower consumption transmission from parents to children in constrained families.
Beside signaling access to credit markets, financial transfers including bequests enable
3Altonji et al. (1997) reported that, for instance, in PSID 1988 sample, the mean age of adult children who
received positive transfer from parents is 29, and the mean age of their parents is 58; only 2.9 percent of these
children were still in school at the time of transfer.
4According to Altonji et al. (1997), the mean was $1507.8 for the subset of PSID 1988 sample with positive
amount of inter vivos transfer money. According to McGarry (1999), the mean of positive amount of inter vivos
transfer money to each child (age 18 and over) was $3013 from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 1992
survey, and was $4215 from the 1993 Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey.
5“Inheritance” is more often used from the viewpoint of the recipient of a bequest. We use “bequests” or
“inheritances” interchangeably throughout the paper.
6Hurd and Smith (2002) provided the size and distribution of actual bequests received by the children of
the elderly surveyed in the 1993 AHEAD survey who passed away prior to the 1995 wave: more than 40% of
children received nothing when their last surviving parent died; the mean size of inheritance is $18, 600, and
only one in ten children collected $54, 000 or more.
7However, Altonji et al. (1997) found that the magnitude of inter vivos transfer is only 13% of what the parental
altruism model implies.
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a parent to guard his offspring against any relative downward trending of consumption
that arises from relative downward trending of lifetime income, thus contribute to a higher
degree of persistence in consumption. From this perspective, the total welfare cost of credit
constraints goes beyond what is revealed by education achievement or lifetime income, and
the benefit of being born in a richer family is not limited to being able to afford elite education.
Our paper tests the connection between credit constraint and intergenerational con-
sumption persistence, using bequest receipt as the signal of constraint status for the parental
households. This test has been featured in Mulligan (1997, 1999).8 However, compared
with Mulligan’s work, we consider the possibility that the variable of bequest receipts is
error-ridden when used as the signal, which may lead to misclassification of observations in
estimation.
We employ switching regressions (SR henceforth) under imperfect sample separation to
correct for the misclassification error. In terms of methodology, there has been only a couple
of studies related to credit constraint in other contexts using SR with imperfect sample
separation (Garcia et al., 1997; Jappelli et al., 1998). To our best knowledge, this is the first
study to employ SR in estimating parameters of intergenerational mobility.9
One traditional limitation of SR models is that the error term under each switching regime
has to be in specific classes of parametric distributions, in particular, the normal distribution.
We show that this does not have to be the case: the SR model of two regimes, under the
Monotonicity Condition (defined in Section 4), is identified when regime error terms exhibit
any arbitrary distributions (see Appendix B).10
8Separately, Grawe (2010) tested the connection between credit constraint and family size effects, also using
bequest receipt as the signal variable. He found contradictory evidence to the theoretical predictions.
9Nevertheless, the same framework has been used in a number of studies in other fields of economics, and
Maddala (1986) provided an excellent survey by then. For instance, Lee and Porter (1984) used the SR model to
test the price behavior under firm collusion in the industry, whereby the binary variable of whether firms are in
collusion or not is at best imperfectly observed. Recent work by Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) employed the SR
framework to signify the existence of significant bequest motives for the elderly that is difficult to detect from
data otherwise.
10For the data we specifically examine, however, a normal distribution for each regime turns out to be adequate.
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Our SR estimates indicate that children raised in credit constrained parental households
are more likely to have consumption levels similar to those of their parents than children
from unconstrained parental households. Since constrained families on average consume
less than unconstrained families, this implies their lower consumption (thus lower utility)
will perpetuate into future generations. The SR model fits data better when compared with
the simple sample splitting procedure. The SR estimates are robust to whether expected,
or actual inheritance, or other various related variables are used for classifying constrained
versus unconstrained families. The estimates are in contrast with the prediction for con-
sumption from the theory, indicating the need of more work to deepen our understanding
of the determinants of the intergenerational economic relationships.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the theory based on
Becker and Tomes (1986). Section 3 describes the data (especially, the two bequest variables),
and presents conventional sample splitting estimates. Section 4 sets up the SR model and
presents SR results along with robustness checks. With estimates contradictory to the theory,
Section 5 discusses possible alternative explanations. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Economic Model of Intergenerational Mobility
The estimation of intergenerational persistence of any kind of economic status, including
consumption, is through the following regression:
log Xc = constant + β log Xp + U , (2.1)
where Xc and Xp are measurements of some economic variable of interest, such as consump-
tion or earnings, for parents and children respectively. In literature, β is often labeled as
the intergenerational persistence, or the degree of intergenerational regression toward the mean,
meaning how much of the economic difference among parents is bestowed onto their chil-
6
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dren; correspondingly, 1 − β is referred to as the intergenerational mobility. Using logarithm
of variables in (2.1) measures the difference on the relative rather than the absolute basis.
To interpret the size of β in (2.1), we present here a simplified version of Becker-Tomes
model assuming a perfect-foresight economy. Suppose individuals live through two con-
secutive time periods: childhood and adulthood. Each parent has exactly one offspring
and his child’s childhood overlaps with the parent’s adulthood. The child has no role in
human capital investment decision-making. By the time she grows up and starts working,
the parent is assumed to pass away.
The parent decides how to allocate his resources between: (1) his own consumption; (2)
his investment in his child’s human capital; (3) the amount of financial transfer he is willing
to pass onto his child. For the sake of simplicity, grandchildren have no explicit role in the
model.
The budget constraint for the parent is:
Cp + h + T = I , (2.2a)
T ≥ 0 , (2.2b)
where Cp is the level of parental consumption, h is the human capital investment in his child,
and T is the financial transfer from parent to child. (2.2b) excludes the possibility for the par-
ent to borrow against the child’s future earnings, capturing the essence of credit constraints
in a simple, tractable way. In reality, credit markets for human capital are imperfect because
private education loan repayment entails limited enforcement for creditors, or because the
private nature of information possessed by adult children in costly job searching or choosing
their work efforts makes contracting on their future earnings difficult,11 or because of the
possibility of “moral hazard” from parents in raising their own consumption by borrowing
11Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011) surveyed the literature that has incorporated these elements into quan-
titative models.
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and leaving substantial debts to their children.
The budget constraint for the adult child is
Cc = (1 + R)T + Bhv, (2.3)
where R is the intergenerational rate of return on financial assets, and B is the child’s innate
ability. As we normalize the labor supply of everyone in the economy to one, the human
capital production function Bhv converts the investment amount and innate ability into
the outcome of the child’s earnings, where 0 < v < 1 captures the characteristic of the
diminishing rate of return from such an investment.
The parent cares about his own consumption as well as his child’s:12
δ
δ − 1C
δ−1
δ
p + α
δ
δ − 1C
δ−1
δ
c , (2.4)
where α(> 0) captures the degree of altruism of parent to child. δ(> 0) is the elasticity
of intergenerational consumption substitution. The parent’s optimization problem is to
maximize (2.4) subject to (2.2) and (2.3).
Let ∆ = 1 if the borrowing constraint (2.2b) is not binding (hence the parent transfers
some assets to the child), and let ∆ = 0 if otherwise (hence the parent makes no transfer of
assets to the child). When ∆ = 1, the efficient human capital investment amount is solved
by equalizing the rate of return between human capital and non-human capital investment,
vBhv−1 = 1 + R ,
therefore
h∗ =
( vB
1 + R
) 1
1−v
.
12This assumption, an alternative to assuming parents care about children’s earnings/income, was invoked in
some of the studies previously reviewed (Tomes, 1981; Cox, 1987, 1990; Altonji et al., 1997; McGarry, 1999).
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It follows that the threshold income for a family to be unconstrained, I0, can be computed
as
I0 = h∗
[
1 +
(αv)−δB1−δ
h∗(1−δ)(1−v)
]
. (2.5)
Therefore the function for the indicator (∆) of being unconstrained is

∆ = 1 if I ≥ I0 ,
∆ = 0 if I < I0 .
(2.6)
Moreover, the amount of asset transfer from parent to child when the family is unconstrained
can be solved out and expressed as
T =
I − h∗ − (1 + R)(h∗/v)(α(1 + R))−δ
1 + (1 + R)[α(1 + R)]−δ
. (2.7)
We solve for the consumption persistence equations for both constrained and uncon-
strained cases:
log Cc = log Cp + δ(logα + log(1 + R)) if ∆ = 1 , (2.8a)
log Cc =
v
v + (1 − v)δ log Cp +
δ
v + (1 − v)δ (v log(αv) + log B) if ∆ = 0 , (2.8b)
which suggests a system of regression equations for the consumption of these two types of
families:
log Cc = β1 log Cp + U1 if ∆ = 1 , (2.9a)
log Cc = β0 log Cp + U0 if ∆ = 0 . (2.9b)
Since 0 < vv + (1 − v)δ < 1, the model predicts β1 > β0 in (2.9). It is helpful to understand
(2.9) with the patterns of intergenerational earnings mobility in mind. For unconstrained
9
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(richer) families, there is more often a downward regression towards the mean in the earnings
of their children; for constrained (poorer) families, there is more often an upward regression.
In the case of a downward regression in children’s earnings, unconstrained parents could
bequeath assets to offset the otherwise implied downward regression in their children’s
consumption, and constrained parents could not afford to do so. In the case of an upward
regression in children’s earnings, which would lead to an upward regression in their con-
sumption without the need of asset transfers, the fact that constrained parents are unable
to borrow against their children’s earnings implies the upward regression of consumption
of their children goes unfettered. To summarize, the absence of borrowing constraint slows
down the degree of regression towards the mean for intergenerational consumption, whereas
the existence of borrowing constraint prevents such a slowdown to occur. Thus, β1 > β0.
This empirical prediction on consumption (β1 > β0) is preserved when human capital
investments are risky and this risk cannot be hedged away in financial markets, or there
are heterogeneities in α, B, or v that are not systematically correlated with family income
(Mulligan, 1997, 1999). The prediction would also be preserved in an otherwise identical,
two-period model (with a working period and a retirement period), as long as the con-
sumption in question is measured for the working period. This is because the within-period
marginal utility of both the parent and the child is equalized intergenerationally, when a
positive asset transfer occurs.13 However, it is unclear whether the predication would be
affected, if the number of children is endogenously determined, or if assortative mating
existing in the marriage market is taken into consideration.
Although it is not a focus of this paper, one may be concerned that the error terms in
13For a sketchy illustration, assume that there are two periods (1 and 2) for both the parent and the child, and
the second period of the parent overlaps with the first period of the child. For simplicity, assume the gross rate
of return is one and the discount rate between periods is zero. α is still the parental altruism. The parent is
maximizing
U(Cp,1) + U(Ip − T − Cp,1) + αU(Cc,1) + αU(Ic + T − Cc,1) ,
while the child is maximizing the sum of last two terms. The within-lifetime Euler equation for the parent
is U′(Cp,1) = U′(Cp,2), and for the child, U′(Cc,1) = U′(Cc,2). When T > 0, U′(Cp,2) = αU′(Cc,2). Therefore,
U′(Cp,1) = αU′(Cc,1), which leads to an equation identical to (2.8a).
10
Page 10 of 47Economic Inquiry
subequations of (2.9), which are correlated to I and hence Cp as implied by (2.6), produce
selection bias. Han and Mulligan (2001) quantitatively investigated this issue for a variety of
numerical values of δ, and find that this selection bias does not affect the relative magnitudes
of β1 and β0, except when the δ is close to 0, then β1 and β0 become difficult to distinguish from
each other. Our results show β1 and β0 are indeed quantitatively and statistically different
from each other.
3 Data and Simple Sample Splitting Estimates
To estimate (2.9), we need parents’ and children’s consumption at comparable ages and an
indicator of bequest transfer from parents to children. In addition, information on relevant
socio-demographic characteristics is needed in order to hold these socio-demographic factors
constant in the regressions. Mulligan (1997, 1999) tested the implications from Becker-Tomes
model on a sample of 1781 parent-child pairs from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), a longitudinal survey of U.S. individuals and their families. Starting in 1968, house-
holds in PSID were interviewed annually through 1997, and since then were interviewed
biannually. When children grew up and left home to form their own households, these
“child split-off” households were also tracked in subsequent interviews.
We use exactly the same sample as is in Mulligan (1997, 1999) for comparison of results.
In this intergenerational sample, parents were surveyed in 1968–1972 and adult children
were surveyed in 1984–1989 at comparable ages. Adult children already participated in the
job market by the time of survey. Consumption is constructed as the weighted average of a
household’s expenditures on food at home, food away from home, rent and the value of the
family’s house.14 We refer readers to Mulligan (1997, 1999) for detailed description of the
14The weights are taken from Skinner’s (1987) study which estimates the weights of these aforementioned
individual consumption components by regressing total consumption on these individual components from
Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CEX) data. This measure of “weighted consumption” is also employed in
Waldkirch et al. (2004).
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sample selection and other aspects of the sample data.
For our purposes, we describe in detail below two types of bequest receipt variables —
expected versus actual inheritances — available in the PSID data, each plagued with its own
source of measurement error. Gaviria (2002) reported the disparity in estimates of earnings
persistence when he uses these two variables to split a PSID sample into unconstrained
and constrained groups.15 Similarly, we find such a disparity in estimates of consumption
persistence when using these two inheritance variables, which motivates the adoption of SR
framework.
3.1 Expected inheritances
In 1984, PSID respondents were asked about how much inheritances they have received up
to 1984,
(k150) Now we’re interested in where people’s assets come from. Have you
(or anyone in your family living there) ever inherited any money or property?
as well as how much they expected to receive in the future:16
(k157) What about future inheritances — are you fairly sure that you (or
someone in your family living there) will inherit some money or property in the
next ten years (emphasis added)?
Since only 9% of adult children in the sample did actually receive any inheritances at some
point prior to 1984, for the sake of convenience we shall label the constructed variable
15Actually, his construction criterion for splitting the sample based on actual inheritances is a mixed one:
whether children reported receiving more than $10, 000 inheritances/gifts in 1984-1989 or whether their parents
had more than $100, 000 in wealth in 1988. Families satisfying either of these two conditions will be regarded
as unconstrained. Using this indicator, Gaviria showed that the earnings or wage mobility is indeed higher in
unconstrained than in constrained families in linear regressions, just as the Becker-Tomes model predicts. Our
conventional linear regression results by using the indicator of actual inheritances also agree with the prediction
of the Becker-Tomes model. Notwithstanding, Gaviria did acknowledge the limitation in relying on the wealth
information: wealthy parents may fail to invest optimally in their children if they are not altruistic enough.
16More “unfolding brackets” questions about the amounts of inheritances would follow, if the respondent
answered “Yes” to either of these two questions.
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from these two questions as the expected inheritance. This variable was used in Mulligan
(1997) to classify the original parental households of 1968–1972 into constrained versus
unconstrained groups. The justification for splitting up the sample by expected inheritances
is that children who expected sizable inheritances from parents were unlikely to have had
difficulty obtaining financial support for schooling, quality health care and other forms
of human capital investment.17 Specifically, Mulligan used a fixed cut-off value of 25, 000
dollars for expected inheritances to split the sample: those who expected to receive more than
25, 000 dollars are from unconstrained families, and those who did not are from constrained
families. 18 19
Based upon the expected inheritance survey questions above, if an interviewee was
fairly sure that her wealthy parents would leave her a sizable bequest, but not sure that
they would pass away in the next ten years, she would choose to answer “no” instead of
“yes”. In addition, the expected inheritance survey questions are not clear on whether gifts
are supposed to be included. This sort of response error originates from the ambiguity in
how respondents had interpreted the survey question.20 With these caveats in mind, we
17The parent’s expectation about how much he is to bequeath to his child is more relevant based upon the
model. Therefore, the implicit assumption here is that children’s expectation coincides with parents’ expectation.
18Note that tying the theoretical construct of borrowing constraint with a certain low range of observable
financial or economic variables has a long history in the literature (Chetty, 2008; Gaviria, 2002; Mulligan, 1997,
1999; Runkle, 1991; Zeldes, 1989). Implicitly, what this assumes is that the sample units falling within the defined
range are “more likely” to be borrowing constrained, a presumption to be explicitly formalized in this paper.
19Answering ”no” or having all missing values in anticipated inheritance will be treated as zero. The key here
is not about the distinction between zero and missing values, but about the group with large size of inheritance
versus all else, i.e., all we need is that the group with sizable inheritances is more likely to be unconstrained
than otherwise, including those with missing values. The possibility that missing-value observations are oth-
erwise more likely to be unconstrained does not sit well with available evidence. Same applies to the actual
inheritances/gifts measure to be introduced next. There are only a dozen of missing observations for expected
inheritances, in contrast to over 700 missing observations for actual inheritances/gifts. Mulligan (1997, Table
8.6, Column 3 and 4) obtained the results almost identical to OLS ones by a Tobit model in regards to the
expected inheritance measure. We experimented with a Tobit model of the consumption persistence regressions
for the actual inheritance measure and also obtain results almost identical to those from OLS. Furthermore, in
the robustness check (refer to pp.22), we estimated the SR model restricted to non-missing observations for the
actual inheritance variable, and obtain similar results.
20 To investigate this issue, we examined the variable of parents’ vital status (Deceased, Alive or N/A) as of
1984 and as of 1994 of the current sample. We found that the distribution of parental vital status for children
who answered ”Yes” to the expected inheritance question is roughly the same as that for those who answered
”No.” The majority of respondents anticipating that they would receive inheritances in years 1984 - 1994 had
13
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examine another piece of inheritance information — actual inheritances/gifts — from the
same database.
3.2 Actual inheritances/gifts
In 1984-1999 (once every five years), and in 2001 and 2003, retrospective, follow-up questions
regarding actual inheritances and gifts21 received are introduced. In the PSID 1989 survey
the question of actual inheritances and gifts posed to the respondent is: 22
(G228) Some people’s assets come from gifts and inheritances. During the last
five years, have you (or anyone in your family living there) received any large
gifts or inheritances of money or property worth $10, 000 or more?
We use the sum of inflation-adjusted actual financial transfers received over the years up
to 2003 to divide the observations into the unconstrained versus constrained group, adopting
the same threshold value $25, 000.23 About 79.1% of these adult children have received zero
or have missing values up to 2003. Figure 1 plots the distribution density of financial
transfers received by those grown children who have received positive inheritances/gifts,
from which we observe that $25, 000 is near the mode and mean of the distribution. Table 1
shows that a majority of adult children in the sample have neither anticipated nor actually
received inheritances/gifts over the period of 1984-2003, and the proportion of those with
actual inheritances/gifts more than $25, 000 is below 10 percent.
both of their parents alive in 1984 as well as in 1994, the same as the pattern for respondents who indicated that
they were not anticipating any inheritances for the same period. Among the few respondents who had neither
parent alive at the time of survey in 1984, some still expressed their anticipation of inheritances from somewhere.
These suggest the data on expected inheritance are probably error-ridden due to response error. Notice that we
do not claim that these expressed expectations from data are irrational, as there might be true surprises when
it comes to the discrepancy between expected and actual inheritances. Our data does not allow us to set apart
whimsical expectations from true surprises to rational expectations.
21Or “actual financial transfers”, which we will use interchangeably.
22Once again, more “unfolding brackets” questions will follow regarding the size and the receiving year, if a
respondent answers ”Yes” to the survey question below.
23This is the same variable used in Grawe (2010) to study the connection between credit constraints and family
size effects.
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This actual inheritance variable has its own caveats. One is the attrition. Although each
year the attrition rate of the PSID sample is fairly small (< 5%), over the years, many cases
of missing values have accumulated for actual inheritance/gift variable. Attrition affects the
classification of an observation, for we code these attrition cases as if their actually received
inheritances/gifts are less than $25, 000, which is not necessarily true. The misclassification
due to this is analogous to the response error associated with expected inheritance. We
examined whether attrition causes systematic discrepancy of some of the relevant variables
for observations that have attrited in later years, as opposed to the ones that have not, by
conducting Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. We found that observations from families with
low consumption, with sons, and with single parents are more likely to disappear over the
years, which favors our treatment of observations with missing values of inheritances to be
more likely in the constrained group.24
The other caveat is that actual inheritances/gifts may contain financial surprises. Some
parents happened to experience financial windfalls at later ages;25 in such cases, the actual
inheritance/gift would diverge from what parents earlier intended to bequeath to children.
This has similar impacts on estimation as those from respondents misreporting their ex-
pected inheritance. In any case, we certainly cannot rule out the sorts of aforementioned
measurement error embedded in the variable.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for groups split by both inheritance variables. Par-
ents ages are statistically, but not economically different between the subsample of sizable
inheritances/gifts and the other. In families where adult children expected to or have re-
ceived sizable inheritances/gifts, they enjoyed higher income, higher consumption and more
schooling years, and their parents also enjoyed higher levels of consumption and income.
24Results are available upon request. Furthermore, SR results changed little when those attrition observations
are excluded (see the Subsection 4.2).
25We will explore this issue in the section of discussion of our results. Nonetheless, missing observations for
parents in their retirement years do not allow us to offer a complete answer.
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3.3 Simple Sample Splitting Estimates
Based upon the binary variable constructed from expected inheritances (De = 1 if a child
expected a total inheritance amount of more than $25, 000 ; De = 0 if otherwise), Mulligan
(1997) estimated (2.9) for the sub-sample of De = 1 versus De = 0 directly, the procedure
we name as the “simple sample splitting” to differentiate from SR that will be considered
later. Children’s household consumption is the dependent variable. Parental household
consumption is the primary independent variable of interest, with covariates controlling
for life-cycle effects.26 These covariates include the child’s gender, the parental household
head’s and the adult children’s age quadratics, their marriage status for the period when
parents and adult children are respectively observed. For the sake of comparison, we follow
his choice of covariates in our SR estimation.27
The main finding from Mulligan (1997) is that the unconstrained families do not seem to
exhibit a higher degree of consumption persistence. In fact, if anything, the unconstrained
families have a lower degree of persistence in consumption than the constrained ones (β̂1 =
0.45 versus β̂0 = 0.55, see the two rightmost columns in Table 3), contrary to the prediction of
our theoretical model. However, we obtain the opposite results when turning to the variable
of actual inheritances/gifts to split the sample. Table 4 presents linear regression estimates
from splitting the sample according to this variable (Da = 1 if a child has actually received
more than $25, 000 inheritances/gifts; Da = 0 if otherwise). Now we obtain something in line
with the theory: we find β̂1 = 0.63 for those likely to be unconstrained (Da = 1) as opposed
to β̂0 = 0.52 for those likely to be constrained (Da = 0).28
26Grawe (2006) discussed the estimation bias in intergenerational earnings persistence resulting from the
deviation of observed earnings from lifetime earnings that varies with age.
27Notably, Mulligan (1997) did not include family size as one of the covariates. Implicitly, the Becker-Tomes
model treats the number of children as a choice variable that is likely to be endogenous.
28These two sets of estimates are both statistically significant at 0.01 level in and by themselves. However, the
difference between 0.45 and 0.55, or the difference between 0.63 and 0.52, is not statistically significant at 0.10
level.
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4 Switching Regression Estimates and Robustness Checks
Therefore, the estimates of intergenerational mobility of consumption are sensitive to which
variable, the expected or actual inheritance, is used for classification. Guided by the theory,
expected inheritances seem to be a better measure than actual inheritances to be used in the
empirical test, for actual inheritances may be affected by parental later-life market luck that
is associated little with earlier credit availability for investing in children. This justification,
however, can be overshadowed, if the mis-measurement caused by the response error in
expected inheritances is severe enough. A sound empirical approach is called upon to
explicitly address the embedded measurement error.
Statistically, the insignificance between estimated β̂1 and β̂0 can possibly be attributed
to the attenuation bias caused by the misclassification error. Interested readers can refer
to Appendix A that proves how the attenuation bias is generated by by classical errors-in-
variables and by setting arbitrary cutoffs to divide the sample.
4.1 Switching Regression Estimates
Adopt the notation
Pr(∆i = 1 | Di = 1) = p1 , Pr(∆i = 0 | Di = 0) = p0 , (4.1)
where ∆i is the true underlying indicator and Di is the observed indicator with misclassifi-
cation error. The simple sample splitting estimates are only consistent when p1 = p0 = 1.
If (4.1) is parameterized into
Pr(∆i = 1 | Di) = F(γ0 + γ1Di) , (4.2)
where γ = (γ0, γ1) is the vector of parameters, then (4.2) is called the switching equation in the
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context of the SR framework and can be viewed as the probability equation of predicting ∆i
from the knowledge of Di.29
With misclassification, 0 < pk < 1 (k = 0, 1), the likelihood function derived from (2.9)
will be
f (log Ci,c | Di = 1) = p1 f (log Ci,c | ∆i = 1) + (1 − p1) f (log Ci,c | ∆i = 0) (4.3a)
f (log Ci,c | Di = 0) = (1 − p0) f (log Ci,c | ∆i = 1) + p0 f (log Ci,c | ∆i = 0) (4.3b)
The identification of parameters in the likelihood function (4.3) requires: (1) (U1,U0)
(called “regime error terms”) in (2.9) belong to a specific family of distributions whose
finite-mixture can be identified up to subscripts, notably normal distributions (Yakowitz
and Spragins, 1968); (2) p1 + p0 > 1 (named as the Monotonicity Condition following Hausman
et al. (1998)30), namely, relying on the imperfect proxy D is better than without it to predict
∆, a condition already implicitly present in the cited literature in Section 1. As will be
shown in the Appendix B, the Monotonicity Condition helps anchor the interpretation of
subscripts, and thus completes the identification of parameters in the model. In our context,
the Monotonicity Condition stipulates that those with a larger size of inheritance/gift are
more likely to be in the unconstrained group of dynasties, an assumption inherited from the
Becker-Tomes model.
Formally, following the literature (Quandt, 1972; Quandt and Ramsey, 1978; Kiefer, 1978,
1979; Lee and Porter, 1984), we define the switching regression (SR) model as follows:
Definition. The system of two-regime equations (2.9), along with the misclassification errors defined
in (4.1), is a switching regression model, if:
1. The possibility of misclassification is non-trivial — 0 < pk < 1 (k = 0, 1);
29In practice, the predictor Di can be generalized to a vector of variables, as long as the Monotonicity Condition
is applicable to at least one of the variables in Di.
30Hausman et al. (1998) used this term to describe the restriction on misclassification error in the dependent
variable of discrete choice models.
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2. The Monotonicity Condition holds — p1 + p0 > 1;
3. The regime error terms (U1,U0) follow one of the finite-mixture identifiable distributions.
We prove, in Appendix B, that the last assumption in the definition above can be relaxed,
in that U1 and U0 can follow any arbitrary distributions and the model is still identified. This
proof relies on the finding in Ferguson (1983) that any arbitrary distribution on the real line
can be indefinitely approximated by a mixture of a countable number of normal distributions.
This extension of identifiability of finite mixtures models is of particular practical interest, for
the consistency of the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) hinges critically on the correct
specification of the distributions of error terms. Our identification result ensures that under
our specific assumptions, if the distributions of error terms are misspecified, it is very likely
the MLE algorithm will not converge or yield sensible estimates. Therefore one can adjust
the number of mixtures upwards or downwards for U1 or U0 until obtaining the best fit
of the data.31 The practical procedure for implementation of SR estimation is delegated to
Appendix C.32
Using the same intergenerational sample from PSID, the SR estimates in Table 3 differ
remarkably from those when the constructed indicator D is used directly. According to our
theoretical model, children anticipating sizable inheritance receipts are more likely to be in
unconstrained families. However, our estimates indicate that constrained families have a
higher consumption persistence rate of 1.05 as opposed to 0.44 for unconstrained families,
larger than previous conventional estimates. The difference is also statistically significant.
The coefficient for the unconstrained case is almost identical compared with that in the
sample splitting OLS, for the majority of the population is unconstrained based upon our
31This is by no means to substitute for a formal statistical test of the number of mixtures or parameter values
of the mixture components. However, as Garel (2007) has noted, theoretical results of testing against more than
two-component mixtures are difficult to obtain.
32Even though (U1,U0) in (2.9) can be of any arbitrary distributions, we found normal distributions are
adequate for our data in estimation. Expanding U1 or U0 further into mixture of two normals would lead to the
estimate of one of the weights over 0.99.
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estimation.
Meanwhile, the interpretation of Pr(∆ = 1 | D = 1) − Pr(∆ = 1 | D = 0) reveals that the
families whose children expect more inheritance are 7.4% more likely to be unconstrained
than the others . The evidence taken as a whole suggests that those unconstrained families
comprise over 80 percent of the population, which surprisingly is fairly close to Jappelli’s
(1990) findings that 19 percent of families are rationed in the credit market from directly
observed data.33 We caution that this interpretation holds only if we still regard intergener-
ational transfer as the indicator of credit constraints.
Now, we turn to the SR estimation employing the actual inheritance/gift splitting indi-
cator. Table 4 presents results both from linear regressions of simple sample splitting and
from SR (Da = 1 if a child received more than $25, 000 inheritances/gifts; Da = 0 if otherwise).
In contrast to simple sample splitting estimates, the SR estimates are almost identical to the
ones using expected inheritance splitting indicator: 0.44 for unconstrained and 1.02 for con-
strained. Without receiving sizable inheritances/gifts, the family will be unconstrained with
probability 0.84; for families receiving sizable inheritances/gifts, this probability increases to
0.93.
It may be useful to plot against each other the raw data of children’s consumption,
the simulated data of children’s consumption based upon SR parameters, and the predicted
values of children’s consumption based upon simple splitting estimates. These are presented
in Figure 2 and Figure 3. For each parent-child observation, we take the values of covariates,
including the value of one of the inheritance indicators, as are given in the data, and generate
consumption value according to our estimated coefficients and estimated distributions of
the random errors. The resulting two figures show that the simulated data from SR fit
raw data better than those from sample splitting OLS, especially in capturing the tails of
33The data in Jappelli’s study did not include details about categories of the loans applied by these families,
e.g., children’s college education loans, as opposed to mortgage loans, therefore it is not clear whether and to
what extent these loans are related to children’s human capital investments.
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the distribution. All told, we believe our SR estimates, in its precision and the fit of data,
represent an improvement over those in Mulligan (1997, 1999).
4.2 Robustness Checks
We performed a number of robustness checks. First, since SR does not treat each observa-
tion as definitely in one underlying group or the other, less sensitivity should be observed
by arbitrarily choosing a threshold value (such as $25, 000) in SR estimates than in simple
sample splitting estimates. We checked this aspect of robustness by looking into actual
inheritances/gifts, for more non-missing, continuous values are available in actual inheri-
tances/gifts than in expected inheritances. Table 5 presents the results. The cutoffs for actual
inheritances/gifts are varied from $ 0 to $ 50, 000 to see how the estimates would be affected.
The most contrasting simple sample splitting estimates among all thresholds are the ones
at the threshold of $ 40, 000: 0.69 versus 0.52. However, SR shows less sensitivity in esti-
mates from varying threshold values: for unconstrained, it is always around 0.44; and for
constrained ones, it is always around 1.0.
Second, we put the logarithm of actual inheritances/gifts into the switching equation
of the regression. In Table 3 and 4, the coefficient of the bequest receipt indicator is not
statistically significant. This may be due to less variation in the dummy variable due to
construction. Plus, a level of transfers from a particular household that signals a non-binding
borrowing constraint does not necessarily indicate a non-binding borrowing constraint for
another household. A uniform threshold across households with different levels of bequest
receipts is not reflective of this difference. Direct deployment of the bequest receipt amount in
a regression thus helps address this concern. We chose the actual inheritances/gifts variable
for this exercise, for it has fewer bracketed or zero/missing values than does the expected
inheritance variable. Table 6 presents the results. The persistence rate of consumption for the
unconstrained is 0.44 and, for the constrained, 0.98, not much different from the estimates
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obtained before. The coefficient for the continuous actual inheritance variable is negative
and now statistically significant at 5% level. In fact, if both the dummy variable of expected
inheritances and the logarithm of actual inheritances/gifts are put into the switching equation
(not shown), the coefficient for the latter is still negative and significant at 10% level.
Third, one may be concerned about the effects of the attrition of adult children from PSID
surveys on our results. 221 adult children of our sample were not observed in the 1994 survey;
753 were not observed in 2003. We estimated the same SR model on the sample exclusive of
all these 753 observations. The persistence rate of consumption for the unconstrained is 0.45
and for the constrained, 1.17, the latter slightly greater than the benchmark. The coefficient
for the actual inheritance variable is again negative and statistically significant at 5% level.
Fourth, we conducted the SR analysis for various subsamples of our data set. We
estimated it on the subset of families wherein fathers are present in 1967-1971, the subset
of sons only, the subset excluding SEO (Survey of Economic Opportunity) observations,34
and the subset of families without parents cohabitation change in 1967-1971. For these
subsamples, the estimates for the unconstrained families range from 0.45 to 0.49, and, for
the constrained families, from 0.98 to 1.33. Qualitatively, these results do not change the
conclusion derived from the entire sample.
Last, we repeated the SR analysis by invoking a richer set of indicators in the switching
equation. These indicators are determinants rather than direct measures of intergenerational
transfers. Given that parental altruism and children’s ability are not observed and are not
controlled for by using these determinants, SR results using these indicators as switching
variables may suffer from omitted variable biases.35 Table 7 presents the sets of included
variables and their associated results. We still obtain a higher consumption persistence rate
for constrained families than for unconstrained families, even though the magnitude for
34SEO oversamples low income households.
35For this point, one only needs to check the terms involved in I0 of the choice equation (2.6), and the terms
defined in U1 and U0 of the outcome equations (2.9).
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constrained families has dropped somewhat (as low as 0.76 in one case). Nonetheless, all
switching variables predict the probability of being in one group versus the other as what
we would expect: parents with adequate savings, owning one or more cars, or the mother
having a college degree are more likely to be unconstrained; parental households with a
nonwhite head, a head aged 50 and above, or more children in schools are more likely to be
in the constrained group.
5 Discussion
Recall that our total consumption is a predicted measure out of a few individual components.
The variance of predicted consumption is less than the true variance, which may generate
upward bias when predicted consumption is used as one of the regressors.36 The R2 for this
consumption prediction regression is 0.724 (Skinner, 1987). A back-of-envelope calculation,
starting from our estimates of 0.44 and 1.02, yields 0.32 versus 0.72 after taking the R2 for
this consumption prediction regression into consideration. 0.32 means only 3.3%(≈ 0.323) of
difference in consumption between two great-grandparent households is predictably trans-
mitted to their descendants of current generation (any other difference in current generation
will be attributed to unpredicted “shocks” that have occurred during this time period); for
the coefficient 0.72, this percentage is 37.3%(≈ 0.723).
Why are our estimates contradictory to the theoretical predictions, in that 0.32 is related
to unconstrained families instead, while 0.72 is related to constrained families? We examine
several alternative interpretations of this finding under the Becker-Tomes framework.
First, could it be caused by any kind of heterogeneity unobservable in data, especially,
the parents’ preference? Mulligan (1997) argued that if the gap of intergenerational mobility
between the unconstrained and constrained groups is to be eliminated, the parental altruism
36See Guo (2010) for a discussion about econometric issues involved in using the predicted consumption
measure.
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has to be somehow negatively correlated with parental resources. If parental altruism is
merely randomly heterogeneous, Han and Mulligan (2001, Figure 5) offered simulation
evidence showing that the persistence rate for constrained families may over take that for
unconstrained ones with a tiny margin, and the degree of intergenerational substitution
elasticity for consumption, at the same time, has to be sufficiently small. Their quantitative
evidence is not remotely adequate to account for the difference as large as 0.32 versus 0.72.
Second, could it be caused by the fact that unconstrained parents spend a smaller fraction
of consumption on foods? It is well known that the share of consumption on food will
decline when income is increased. Our consumption measure is constructed not only by
food expenditure, yet food expenditure is an essential component. For simplicity, suppose
consumption is predicted from food expenditure alone. Let fi,t be the food expenditure
for the family i in generation t, τ the average food expenditure share of total consumption
(which is presumably less for unconstrained families), and ξi,t the idiosyncratic part of food
expenditure share, then
fi,t = τξi,tCi,t
Logarithmic version of which is
log fi,t = log τ + log ξi,t + log Ci,t
Now, if the prediction based on log fi,t, rather than log Ci,t itself, is directly used in intergen-
erational consumption persistence regressions, what matters is the variance and co-variance
of log ξi,t within each of unconstrained and constrained groups, not the relative magnitude
of τ between these two groups. That is, it has more to do with the variation in food shares
within each group, rather than the level of food shares. More evidence is needed to consider
this possibility.37
37We can investigate household consumption surveys (such as CEX, or recent years of PSID) for this issue, but
again, the challenge is whether financial transfer variables (preferable to parental income or wealth) are available
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Third, could it be caused by failure of the Monotonicity Condition? Is it possible that
those who received sizable inheritances/gifts are actually children of parents who were once
borrowing constrained? These parents could not have spent more on their children early
on, and chose sizable bequests/gifts later to compensate for their disadvantaged children.
If so, actual inheritances should be positively correlated with measures of adult children’s
economic or financial needs, conditional on inheritances they had already expected to receive.
For suggestive evidence we refer to Table 8. This table presents the correlations of actual
inheritances/gifts with measures of adult children’s economic wellbeing,38 conditional on
parental income and the expected inheritance dummy variable.39
Evident from Table 8, the size of actual inheritances/gifts is strongly positively correlated
with children’s education and wealth, conditional on expected inheritances and parental
income. Owning a house is often associated with various financial and liquidity advantages
(Sheiner, 1995; Engelhardt, 1996; Robst et al., 1999; Cooper, 2013), yet homeowners among
adult children received more inheritances than non-homeowners. Likewise, having more
kids to raise demands more financial resources, yet adult children with more kids received
less transfers from their own parents. All these evidences suggest that compensation motive,
if there is any, is of secondary effect and cannot reverse the signaling power of bequest receipts
as an indicator of parents not being borrowing constrained, i.e., our original interpretation
of the Monotonicity Condition.
Last, could it be because that earnings are more persistent in constrained families, and that
consumption simply tracks each generation’s earnings without intergenerational linkage?
To address this concern we conducted similar analysis for earnings and wages. The SR
to divide the observations into the constrained versus unconstrained, even with more detailed consumption data.
38Note that these variables are mostly in negative correspondence with the degree of financial needs, e.g.,
higher income means less needs of financial help, other things equal.
39Since information is not available for most of these parents at the time of bequeathing, this regression
should be interpreted with caution. A positive correlation between, say, parental wealth close to the time
of bequeathing and children’s wellbeing, would bias the estimates towards being more significant than the
otherwise. Yet, insofar as late-age parental wealth is positively correlated with parental income and children’s
expected inheritances, this bias will be partially mitigated.
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model failed to detect the existence of two groups from our data of earnings or wages.40 The
algorithm either never converged, or, even if it converged, the estimated coefficients for the
two groups bore little difference. This is so even when we included the same sets of variables
in the switching equation as those we have used for the consumption persistence estimation,
or when we experimented with non-normal distributions for the error terms. Thus, our
results on consumption cannot be attributed to consumption simply tracking generational
earnings or wages.
In this regard, Waldkirch et al. (2004) estimated a structural model that assumes the
consumption of each generation is a function of its own permanent income, but there will be
correlations of consumption between parents and children even after parsing out the effects
of own income on consumption. Interestingly, they found that, for families whose adult
children did not receive financial transfers from parents, or did not receive financial help
towards the down payment of a house—would-be “constrained” families according to our
definition—the estimated transmission degree of this residual consumption is higher than
that for the entire sample (0.55-0.61 versus 0.45) (Waldkirch et al., 2004, Table 5, pp.373).41
This goes in the same direction as what has been shown for the consumption persistence
from our sample, and one suspects the difference would be even larger if SR is called upon
to correct for possible noise in the transfers data they use.
6 Conclusion
This paper applies SR to estimating the intergenerational consumption persistence for credit
constrained and unconstrained families, in order to test a related implication of the Becker-
40Han and Mulligan (2001) used simulations to show that, should there be a lot of heterogeneity in earn-
ings ability in the population, it would not be easy to detect earnings persistence between constrained and
unconstrained families in regressions, even in the absence of the misclassification issue.
41Waldkirch et al. (2004, Table 5) also presented the results related to their defined “liquidity constrained”
cases. But it is defined from the life-cycle viewpoint of adult children instead of intergenerational viewpoint of
parents. And they simply define those with low income as liquidity constrained.
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Tomes model. Our focus is the issue that, if a family’s access to credit markets for children’s
human capital investments — as signaled by bequest receipt — is imperfectly measured
and contains misclassification error, resulting estimates will suffer from attenuation bias.
By employing SR to account for this misclassification error, our estimates reveal that the
intergenerational consumption persistence is higher for credit constrained families than for
unconstrained families. This result indicates that adult children of credit constrained families
are more likely to have consumption levels similar to their parents’ than are children of
unconstrained families. Estimates from SR fit data better and are robust over a number of
various specifications.
Under the settings of our model, we relax the parametric assumptions for identification,
which are often imposed by the traditional SR literature, although for our data, the normal
distribution turns out to fit well for each underlying group. Our approach does require,
however, that the misclassification error in Di is uncorrelated with error terms in each of the
two regime equations. This assumption seems innocuous given our focus on data issues
and we have not been alarmed to evidence suggesting the otherwise. This assumption can
be relaxed if additional instrumental variables for the true status (Lewbel, 2007; Mahajan,
2006) or independently repeated measurements of the true status (Hu, 2010) are available.42
Then, why are our estimates contradictory to the theoretical predictions? We have
discussed several possible explanations that can address this discrepancy between evidence
and theory, yet none of them seems particularly attractive. More future research is needed
to address this discrepancy.
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A The Misclassification due to Measurement Error
This section demonstrates the misclassification caused by measurement error (due to re-
sponse error, for example) in inheritance (expected or actual), T. In our definition of uncon-
strained families, positive inheritance is a one-to-one mapping to the unconstrained status
in intergenerational investment for a particular observation indexed i
Pr(∆i = 1 | Ti > 0) = 1 (A.1)
Suppose instead of observing T, we observe an error-riden variable T∗ = T − ε, where ε
is variation free of T. Since T∗ cannot be negative in our setting, ε ≤ T. Therefore for a
particular value of T, the distribution of ε is a truncated one, the probability density function
of which is denoted by fε|ε≤T(·).
Using T∗ instead of T to classify gives us
Pr(∆i = 1 | T∗i > 0) (A.2)
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Using the dummy indicator D to represent the constraint status by employing T∗, for any
particular εi, we have
Pr(∆i = 1 | Di = 1, εi,Ti) = Pr(Ti > 0 | T∗i > 0, εi,Ti) = Pr(Ti > 0 | Ti > εi, εi,Ti)
=

1 if Ti ≥ εi ≥ 0
1 − FT(0)
1 − FT(εi) if εi < 0
(A.3)
where FT(T) is the cumulative distribution function of T. Since εi is unobservable, we
integrate over its support for those with Ti
Pr(∆i = 1 | Di = 1,Ti) =
∫ Ti
−∞
Pr(∆i = 1 | Di = 1, εi) fε|ε≤Ti(ε)d ε
= 1 − Fε|ε≤Ti(0) + [1 − FT(0)]
∫ 0
−∞
fε|ε≤Ti(ε)
1 − FT(ε)d ε ≡ p(0; Ti)
(A.4)
whose value is between 0 and 1 under regular assumptions about the distributions of FT(.)
and Fε(.).
We integrate (A.4) over Ti for the subsample Di = 1, since Ti is not directly observed:
Pr(∆i = 1 | Di = 1) =
∫
Ti
p(0; Ti) d F(Ti) (A.5)
which is still between 0 and 1. This means the subsample of Di = 1 will be a mixed group
including both Di = 1 and Di = 0 observations. Lee and Porter (1984) have proved that such
a misclassification will lead to attenuation bias in estimated β1.
Studies on liquidity constraints (Zeldes, 1989; Runkle, 1991; Mulligan, 1997) arbitrarily
specify a positive cut-off value instead of 0. Therefore instead of (A.2), we have
Pr(∆i = 1 | T∗i > T¯) (A.6)
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where T¯ is some positive number. Correspondingly, (A.4) now becomes
Pr(∆i = 1 | Di = 1,Ti; T¯) = 1 − Fε|ε≤Ti(−T¯) + [1 − FT(−T¯)]
∫ −T¯
−∞
fε|ε≤Ti(ε)
1 − FT(ε)d ε ≡ p(T¯; Ti) (A.7)
and
Pr(∆i = 1 | Di = 1) =
∫
Ti
p(T¯; Ti) d F(Ti) (A.8)
It is easy to prove that
d p(T¯; Ti)
d T¯
≥ 0
Thus, when the threshold is lifted, we should expect the subsample Di as defined to enclose
more and more genuinely ∆i = 1 observations, and the attenuation bias for β1 would be
alleviated. However, also associated with lifting thresholds, the sample size of Di = 1 is
shrinking, which may lead to imprecise and less robust estimates.
B Proof of Identification of Two-regime Switching Regressions
with Arbitrary Regime Error Term Distributions
Yakowitz and Spragins (1968) establish the result that finite-mixtures of normals can be
identified up to “label switching”. Ferguson (1983) proves that any arbitrary distribution on
the real line can be indefinitely approximated by a mixture of a countable number of normal
distributions subject to label switching, i.e., for any density function f (x),
f (x) =
∞∑
i=1
ciφ(x|µi, σ2i ), 0 < ci < 1,
∞∑
i=1
ci = 1
These two results, coupled with the Monotonicity Condition, underly our sketch of proof of
identification.
To fix ideas, suppose each of the error terms in (2.9), U1 and U0, can be adequately
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described by a two-component normal mixtures:
f (u1) = c1φ(u1|µ1, σ21) + (1 − c1)φ(u1|µ2, σ22) (B.1a)
f (u0) = c0φ(u0|µ3, σ23) + (1 − c0)φ(u0|µ4, σ24) (B.1b)
“Label switching” means, for instance, in (B.1a), we do not really care which weight is labeled
as c1 and which as 1 − c1, or which is labeled as (µ1, σ1) and which as (µ0, σ0), because there
is no meaningful interpretation attached to each label. A simple rule, such as c1 ≤ 0.5, or
µ1 ≤ µ2, would help anchor the labels if so desired. Another notable fact from either (B.1a) or
(B.1b) is that even without label identification, the matching between weights and normals
is never confused. We also exploit this fact in what follows.
This irrelevance of labels is subject to change when we refer the label 1 to the uncon-
strained group as in our intergenerational mobility model. Due to the imperfect classification
by D, the subgroup of observations D = 1 includes cases drawn from both U1 and U0. Con-
sequently, the distribution of the error term for D = 1, denoted by U˜1, is in turn a mixture of
U1 and U0 (recall that p1 = Pr(∆ = 1 | D = 1)):
f (u˜1) = p1 f (u1) + (1 − p1) f (u0)
= p1
[
c1φ(µ1, σ21) + (1 − c1)φ(µ2, σ22)
]
+ (1 − p1)
[
c0φ(µ3, σ23) + (1 − c0)φ(µ4, σ24)
] (B.2)
Even though the label switching between ci and 1 − ci (i = 0, 1) is innocuous, we have to
ascertain which is p1 as opposed to 1 − p1 due to the meaning of the label 1 in p1.
(B.2) is a mixture of four normals that can still be identified up to labels, thus four weights
are obtained alongside with four different sets of (µi, σi), denoted by (˜a1, a˜2, a˜3, a˜4). However,
nothing is known about which of them corresponds to which of (p1c1, p1(1−c1), (1−p1)c0, (1−
p1)(1 − c0)).
Likewise, the distribution of the error term for D = 0 has a similar form (p0 = Pr(∆ = 0 |
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D = 0)):
f (u˜0) = (1 − p0) f (u1) + p0 f (u0)
= (1 − p0)
[
c1φ(µ1, σ21) + (1 − c1)φ(µ2, σ22)
]
+ p0
[
c0φ(µ3, σ23) + (1 − c0)φ(µ4, σ24)
] (B.3)
from which we can obtain (˜b1, b˜2, b˜3, b˜4). Notice that the same subscript i in a˜i and b˜i indicates
they are associated with the same normal component of the mixture.
An examination of the ratios of a˜i and b˜i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) reveals that they can only take
either value of: p11−p0 and
1−p1
p0
, from which we can solve out two unknowns. The solution of
these two unknowns (denoted by p˜1 and p˜0) still suffers from the unidentification of labels,
because we are yet to distinguish between the following two possibilities:
p˜1 = p1, p˜0 = p0 (B.4a)
p˜1 = 1 − p1, p˜0 = 1 − p0 (B.4b)
Here is when the Monotonicity Condition shows its power: only one of (B.4a) and (B.4b)
will satisfy the condition, which helps anchor the labels of p1 and p0. After this step, given
the information of p1 and p0, ci (i = 1, 0) can be subsequently recovered from the fact that
ci and 1 − ci are associated with the same normal components that p j or 1 − p j ( j = 1, 0) is
associated with, from either (B.2) or (B.3). Therefore the underlying distributions of U1 and
U0 are completely recovered. The same line of reasoning in this proof can be extended to the
case of more than two normal mixture components in U1 or U0.
C Implementation of Switching Regression Estimation
For the sake of illustration, we assume U j ( j = 0, 1) are normals:
U j ∼ N(0, σ2j ) ( j = 0, 1).
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Non-normal distributions of U j only involve decomposing it further into mixture of normals.
Then, the likelihood function is
L =
∏
i
[
φ1(·)p1 + φ0(·)(1 − p1)
]Di [
φ1(·)(1 − p0) + φ0(·)p0
]1−Di
(C.1)
where φ j(·) is the PDF of U j.
To make the model parsimonious, we write p1 and p0 as a binary function of Di, F(Di), such
that F(1) = p1 and F(0) = 1 − p0. We choose F(Di) = 11 + exp(γ0 + γ1Di) . Given the functional
form of F(·), if γ1 < 0, then F(1) > F(0), which means receiving a sizable inheritance/gift will
be more likely to be classified into the group whose estimates are indexed by 1. Therefore,
by the Monotonicity Condition, this group should be labeled as the unconstrained group.
F(·) can include more than one switching variable, as long as the Monotonicity Condition is
applicable to at least one of these variables to ensure identifiability. The likelihood function
now becomes
L =
∏
i
[
φ1(·)F(Di) + φ0(·)(1 − F(Di))
]
. (C.2)
A well-known challenge of maximizing the likelihood function like (C.2) is that, when
σ goes to zero, the value of likelihood function explodes, which does not constitute a valid
estimate. There are at least two ways of getting around this issue. For the first, Kiefer (1978)
proves that the likelihood equation (C.2) has a consistent and asymptotically efficient root,
and suggests using the method of moment generating functions as laid out in Quandt and
Ramsey (1978) to find out the initial consistent estimate. Schmidt (1982) improves Quandt
and Ramsey’s (1978) estimator by demonstrating that the generalized method of moments
applied to the aforementioned moment generating function performs better. For the second,
Hathaway (1985) shows that simple constraints on σi that the relative ratios of either one to
the other cannot be too small can help rule out spurious local maximizers. That is, if the
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constraints
min
j,k
(σ j/σk) ≥ c > 0 ∀ j, k (C.3)
are imposed, where c is a sufficiently small number and j, k are indexing any two of regime
error terms, then the maximum likelihood problem is well defined in optimization, and the
global solution is strongly consistent.
We follow Hathaway’s (1985) method for its simplicity in implementation. We pick the
constraint parameter c = 0.0067 which is adequately small for the iterations to converge.
After obtaining the initial consistent estimates through this step, we feed them as initial
values into a subsequent, more refined MLE step.
D Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Density plot of actual inheritances/gifts received by adult children up to 2003 in
PSID intergenerational sample
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Figure 2: Densities of fitted and actual adult children’s consumption: classification using
expected inheritance indicator
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Figure 3: Densities of fitted and actual adult children’s consumption: classification using
actual inheritance/gift indicator
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Table 1: Distribution of expected and actual inheritance/gift by size
Expected Inheritance as of 1984 [$25,000, +∞) (0, $25,000) 0 / (missing)
Total 166 (9.3%) 171 (9.6%) 1444 (81.1%)
Actual Inheritance/gift received
Prior to 1984
[$25,000, +∞) 10 (0.6%) 5 (0.3%) 39 (2.2%)
(0, $25,000) 12 (0.7%) 14 (0.8%) 81 (4.5%)
0 / (missing) 144 (8.1%) 152 (8.5%) 1324 (74.3%)
1984─1994
[$25,000, +∞) 26 (1.5%) 13 (0.7%) 70 (3.9%)
(0, $25,000) 25 (1.4%) 26 (1.5%) 123 (6.9%)
0 / (missing) 115 (6.5%) 132 (7.4%) 1251 (70.2%)
1994─2003
[$25,000, +∞) 16 (0.9%) 8 (0.4%) 39 (2.2%)
(0, $25,000) 8 (0.4%) 9 (0.5%) 52 (2.9%)
0 / (missing) 142 (8.0%) 154 (8.6%) 1353 (76.0%)
In total
[$25,000, +∞) 39 (2.2%) 20 (1.1%) 106 (6.0%)
(0, $25,000) 24 (1.3%) 31 (1.7%) 152 (8.5%)
0 / (missing) 103 (5.8%) 120 (6.7%) 1186 (66.6%)
Notes: figures in each cell include number of observations accompanied by the 
corresponding fraction relative to the whole sample size. 
Table 2: Summary statistics of relevant variables by expected and actual inheritance/gift size
in PSID intergenerational sample
Variable all
 act. Inheritance≥$25,000  act. Inheritance<$25,000  act. Inheritance≥$25,000  act. Inheritance<$25,000
Parent's age (a) 40.3 43.0 42.0 41.6 39.9
(7.4) (7.9) (7.3) (7.8) (7.3)
Parent's income (b) 28661.59 41407.35 29366.85 36942.06 27452.50
(19880.37) (27667.92) (17224.92) (17970.01) (19523.75)
Parent's consumption (b) 17224.65 21386.75 17644.44 21635.12 16694.53
(7577.35) (8167.39) (7187.16) (9220.81) (7312.35)
Parent's wage (c) 10.18 13.44 10.07 13.33 9.82
(7.41) (7.85) (6.10) (6.77) (7.49)
Parent's education achievement (d) 10.44 12.39 10.73 12.04 10.21
(3.67) (4.08) (3.59) (3.41) (3.62)
Child's age (e) 31.3 31.9 31.8 30.6 31.3
(2.6) (2.6) (2.6) (2.9) (2.6)
Child's income (b) 27283.13 40043.55 32050.94 33447.17 25791.74
(19729.82) (16881.34) (25822.68) (20496.73) (18688.22)
Child's consumption (b) 13334.61 19162.79 14779.99 16274.73 12721.57
(7274.90) (8560.21) (8894.92) (8270.92) (6756.71)
Child's wage (c) 8.24 9.34 9.21 9.48 8.00
(5.36) (5.22) (7.59) (5.48) (5.04)
Child's education achievement (d) 13.21 14.29 13.36 14.18 13.08
(2.17) (2.10) (2.23) (2.15) (2.14)
expected Inheritance < $25,000
Notes: This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the variables for the entire sample as well as for each of the four subgroups 
defined by the sizes of expected inheritance and actual inheritance. (a) the parental household head's age as of 1967; (b) in thousand dollars; (c) in dollars; (d) 
years of schooling; (e) child's age as of 1987.
expected Inheritance ≥ $25,000
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Table 3: Switching regression and simple sample splitting regressions of intergenerational
consumption persistence: classification based on expected inheritances
Estimation Methods
∆=1 (b) ∆=0 (b) D e =1 (c) D e =0 (c)
parental consumption(d) 0.4394 1.0527 0.4491 0.5487
(0.0237) (0.1425) (0.0770) (0.0358)
daughter dummy -0.0400 0.3524 0.0282 -0.0232
(0.0207) (0.1146) (0.0655) (0.0280)
parental marital status -0.0210 0.0205 -0.0101 -0.0076
(0.0066) (0.0362) (0.0225) (0.0117)
child's marital status 0.4465 1.3008 0.6222 0.6058
(0.0246) (0.1438) (0.0990) (0.0345)
parent's age (x10-1)(e) -0.1130 -0.1810 0.7487 -0.1703
(0.1157) (0.7600) (0.4141) (0.1604)
parent's age squared (x10-3)(e) 0.1287 0.2534 -0.8822 0.1922
(0.1359) (0.8964) (0.4516) (0.1856)
child's age  (x10-1)(e) -1.0510 5.2938 0.4896 -0.2741
(0.8404) (4.1824) (3.2374) (1.2167)
child's age squared (x10-3)(e) 2.0703 -8.2160 -0.1292 0.6997
(1.3425) (6.6167) (5.1189) (1.9581)
(intercept) 6.4907 -10.540 1.7653 4.2185
(1.3313) (6.7839) (5.1462) (1.9292)
σU 0.3547 0.6616
(0.0093) (0.0392)
γ0
γ1
maximized loglikelihood
Pr(∆|De=1)(f) 0.9167 0.0933
Pr(∆|De=0)(f) 0.8423 0.1577
Consumption persistence regression: classification according to expected inheritances
Notes: sample size 1781; dependent variable: adult child's logarithm of consumption; standard
error in parenthesis; expected inheritance indicator is used for identifying which set of parameters
in the switching regression corresponds to the regime of borrowing constrained (∆=0). See text for
details. (a) linear regressions for each subsample with standard error clustered by parental family
identifiers; (b) 1--"unconstrained"; 0--"constrained"; (c) 1--expected inheritance greater than
$25,000 (219 cases); 0--expected inheritance less than $25,000 (1562 cases); (d) consumption is
the logrithm of multi-year average of Skinner(1987) consumption measure; (e) parent's age is the
household head's age as of 1967; child's age is the child's age as of 1987; (f) probability of being
"unconstrained" or "constrained" conditional on the value of the indicator De; calculated from
Ф(γ0+γ1De), where Ф(.) is the CDF of standard normal distribution.
-1.0040
(0.1304)
-0.3290
(0.4255)
Simple sample splitting (a)Switching regression
-1109.17
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Table 4: Switching regression and simple sample splitting regressions of intergenerational
consumption persistence: classification based on actual inheritances/gifts
Variable
∆=1 (b) ∆=0 (b) D a =1 (c) D a =0 (c)
parental consumption(d) 0.4398 1.0176 0.6254 0.5229
(0.0236) (0.1376) (0.0948) (0.0363)
daughter dummy -0.0400 0.3263 -0.0086 -0.0289
(0.0206) (0.1151) (0.0713) (0.0272)
parental marital status -0.0220 0.0240 -0.0506 -0.0065
(0.0066) (0.0360) (0.0306) (0.0112)
child's marital status 0.4474 1.2824 0.5212 0.6110
(0.0245) (0.1437) (0.1056) (0.0339)
parent's age (x10-1)(e) -0.1130 -0.2170 -0.2391 -0.0691
(0.1148) (0.7710) (0.3791) (0.1609)
parent's age squared (x10-3)(e) 0.1285 0.2854 0.2538 0.0675
(0.1346) (0.9063) (0.4260) (0.1858)
child's age  (x10-1)(e) -1.1060 4.4107 1.0696 -0.4862
(0.8388) (4.1255) (2.8681) (1.2236)
child's age squared (x10-3)(e) 2.1587 -6.7650 -1.0324 1.0615
(1.3412) (6.4890) (4.5347) (1.9639)
(intercept) 6.5716 -8.762 1.4808 4.5718
(1.3291) (6.5981) (4.3258) (1.9509)
σU 0.3534 0.6656
(0.0092) (0.0372)
γ0
γ1
maximized loglikelihood
Pr(∆|Da=1)(f) 0.9284 0.0716
Pr(∆|Da=0)(f) 0.8399 0.1601
Notes: sample size 1781; dependent variable: adult child's logarithm of consumption; standard
error in parenthesis; actual inheritance indicator is used for identifying which set of parameters in
the switching regression corresponds to the regime of borrowing constrained (∆=0). See text for
details. (a) linear regressions for each subsample with standard error clustered by parental family
identifiers; (b) 1--"unconstrained"; 0--"constrained"; (c) 1--received actual inheritances/gifts greater
than $25,000 (165 cases); 0--received actual inheritances/gifts less than $25,000 (1616 cases); (d)
consumption is the logrithm of multi-year average of Skinner(1987) consumption measure; (e)
parent's age is the household head's age as of 1967; child's age is the child's age as of 1987; (f)
probability of being "unconstrained" or "constrained" conditional on the value of proxy indicator Da
calculated from Ф(γ0+γ1Da), where Ф(.) is the CDF of standard normal distribution.
Consumption persistence regression: classification according to actual inheritances/gifts
Switching regression
-0.9940
-1108.76
(0.1267)
-0.4700
(0.5883)
Simple sample splitting (a)
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Table 5: Estimated consumption persistence by using alternative cut-offs of actual inheri-
tances/gifts for constructing the classification indicator: simple sample splitting and switch-
ing regressions
Threshold value $0 $5k $10k $25k $30k $40k $50k
Sample Size (D = 1) 372 329 265 165 141 121 102
Simple sample splitting regression estimates
β1 (unconstrained) 0.5712 0.5449 0.5717 0.6254 0.6514 0.6905 0.6421
(0.0591) (0.0640) (0.0706) (0.0893) (0.0978) (0.1104) (0.1214)
β0 (constrained) 0.5067 0.5126 0.5157 0.5229 0.5239 0.5278 0.5328
(0.0360) (0.0351) (0.0338) (0.0324) (0.0322) (0.0318) (0.0316)
Switching regression estimates
β1 (unconstrained) 0.4401 0.4439 0.4426 0.4398 0.4396 0.4387 0.4353
(0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0236)
β0 (constrained) 0.9889 0.9936 1.0061 1.0176 1.0269 0.9994 1.0461
(0.1408) (0.1417) (0.1390) (0.1376) (0.1310) (0.1368) (0.1597)
Pr(∆ = 1 | D = 1) 0.9246 0.9220 0.9274 0.9284 0.9057 0.8876 0.9077
Pr(∆ = 0 | D = 1) 0.0754 0.0780 0.0726 0.0716 0.0943 0.1124 0.0923
Pr(∆ = 1 | D = 0) 0.8329 0.8411 0.8415 0.8399 0.8435 0.8419 0.8373
Pr(∆ = 0 | D = 0) 0.1671 0.1589 0.1585 0.1627 0.1565 0.1581 0.1366
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. D = 1 if received actual inheritances/gifts are greater
than the specified cutoff value, and D = 0 if otherwise.
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Table 6: Switching regression estimates of intergenerational consumption persistence: log
of actual inheritances/gifts in the switching equation
Variable Switching equation
Δ= 1(a) Δ=0(a) Prob(Δ=1 | D)(b)
parental consumption(c) 0.4442 0.9832
(0.0266) (0.2824)
daughter dummy -0.0378 0.3421
(0.0207) (0.1188)
parental marital status -0.0215 0.0204
(0.0072) (0.0370)
child's marital status 0.4493 1.3048
(0.0254) (0.1469)
parent's age(d) -0.0108 -0.0224
(0.0126) (0.0517)
parent's age squared 0.0001 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0006)
child's age(d)  -0.1223 0.5812
(0.0877) (0.5609)
child's age squared 0.0024 -0.0091
(0.0014) (0.0090)
log of actual inheritances/gifts(e) —— —— -0.0838
(0.0426)
(Constant) 6.6932 -10.556 -1.6380
(1.3469) (8.6517) (0.1920)
σU 0.3565 0.6606
(0.0118) (0.0413)
sample average of:
            predicted Prob(Δ=1)(f)
predicted Prob(Δ=1 | actual inheritances > 0)(f)
predicted Prob(Δ=1 | actual inheritances = 0)(f)
maximized loglikelihood
0.8552
0.9231
0.8373
(c) consumption is the logrithm of multi-year average of Skinner(1987) consumption measure for a household;
(d) parent's age is the household head's age as of 1967; child's age is the child's age as of 1987;
(f) computed as the predicted value based on the estimated coefficients of switching equation.
(e) continuous variable, computed as log of ammount of actually received inheritances/gifts;
Consumption persistence switching regression: log of actual inheritances/gifts
Regime equation
-1106.67
Notes: sample size 1781; dependent variable: adult child's logarithm of consumption; standard error in
parenthesis.
(a) 1--"unconstrained"; 0--"constrained";
(b) probability of being truly "unconstrained" or "constrained" conditional on the value of a vector of variables
D, in the form of F(Dγ)=1/(1+exp(Dγ)) in accordance with the identification of unconstrained group;
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Table 7: Switching regression estimates of intergenerational consumption persistence: alter-
native sets of switching variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regime equation
Δ=1 ("borrowing unconstrained group")
parental consumption 0.4436*** 0.4351*** 0.4407*** 0.4381***
(0.0257) (0.0262) (0.0273) (0.0256)
Δ=0 ("borrowing constrained group")
parental consumption 0.9009*** 0.8209*** 0.9513*** 0.7630***
(0.1641) (0.1551) (0.1615) (0.1664)
Switching equation (a)
parental savings(b) -0.9073*** -0.7628***
(0.2616) (0.2568)
number of children in school 0.1585** 0.1524**
(0.0617) (0.0640)
parental homeownership -0.0765
(0.2534)
parental car ownership -0.6504** -0.4246
(0.2832) (0.2792)
parental head is nonwhite 1.2903*** 0.8158***
(0.2704) (0.2958)
father's age above50 0.7855** 1.0232***
(0.3355) (0.3636)
mother's education level college and above -0.5175 -0.7574* -0.4501
(0.3264) (0.3873) (0.3364)
lots of readings at parental home(c) -0.3275
(0.3161)
parental home in rural area(d) 0.1266
(0.3118)
sample average of predicted Prob(Δ=1)(e) 0.8556 0.8478 0.8566 0.8515
maximized loglikelihood value -1089.9510 -1090.2499 -1106.4757 -1079.5978
(e) the predicted value of Prob(Δ=1) is computed based on the estimated coefficients of switching equation.
(d) =1 if lived 50 miles or more from the center of a city in each year of 1968-1972; =0 if otherwise.
Alternative specifications of switching equation
Notes: These regressions are conducted on the full sample of 1781 parent-child pairs. The dependent variable
is the adult child's logarithm of consumption. The independent variables in regime equations, other than the
logarithm of parental consumption, are identical to those in previous tables, and their estimated coefficients are
omitted. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate the statistical significance of a coefficient at 0.01,
0.05, or 0.10, respectively.
(a) all the variables in the switching equation are measured in 1968-1972 when a child resided with his/her
parents.
(b) =1 if parents ever saved more than two month's income in 1968-1972; =0 if otherwise.
(c) =1 if a lot of reading material was visible in the drelling uinit; =0 if otherwise. 
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Table 8: Prediction regression of actual inheritances/gifts received conditional on expected
inheritances
Variable
expected Inheritances > 25000(c )
log of parental income in 1967-1971(d)
log of adult children's income in 1984-1988(d)
log of adult children's wealth in 1984(e)
adult children's education attainment 
(measured in years)
adult children's homeownership in 1984-1988
adult children's car ownership in 1984-1988
average number of adult children's kids 
(under age of 18 in 1984-1988)
maximized loglikelihood value -1937.2367
(0.485)
0.6585***
(0.246)
(0.118)
2.9156**
(1.246)
0.8955
(2.672)
-1.2842***
Prediction of actual inheritance/gift conditonal on expected inheritance
Notes: Sample size is 1768. Dependent variable is adult child's log of actual inheritance
received. Standard error are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate the statistical significance
of a coefficient at 0.01, 0.05, or 0.10, respectively. Other control variables are included
in the specification whose results are not shown: a dummy variable for an adult child's
gender; the fraction of years a parent or an adult child is being married during the years
when they are observed; an age quadratic for a father in 1967 and an adult child in
1987. (a) standard error is clustering adjusted by parental family identifiers; (b) those
with zero or missing actual inheritance are treated as cencored observations in
estimation; (c) a dummy variable, constructed as equal to one if the expected
inheritance is greater than $25,000 and equal to zero if less than $25,000; (d)
household income is the logarithm of multi-year average of corresponding years; (e) if
the wealth level (w) is negative, compute it as -log(-w).
Tobit (a,b)
8.6245***
(1.044)
5.2678***
(0.969)
0.3467
(0.877)
0.4847***
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